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BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS AND THE SHAPE
OF AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW
David A. Skeel, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
A casual observer would no doubt assume that the United States
~has always had federal bankruptcy legislation on the books. This
impression is understandable, since bankruptcy law has been firmly in
place for the entire twentieth century. But this was not always so. In
the nineteenth century, bankruptcy legislation was much more the ex-
ception than the norm. Congress passed bankruptcy laws in 1800,1
1841,2 and 1867,3 but lawmakers quickly changed their minds and re-
pealed their handiwork in each instance. It wasn't until 1898 that
Congress finally passed a bankruptcy law with staying power.'
Though frequently amended, most dramatically in 1938,1 the 1898 Act
lasted until Congress replaced it with the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.6
This much one can find by quickly perusing any of the standard
accounts of bankruptcy history.7 What one does not find in the bank-
ruptcy law literature is a persuasive account as to why bankruptcy sud-
denly became permanent in 1898. What was the magic in the 1898 Act
that spared it the fate of each of its predecessors?
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University. I am grateful to Brad Hansen,
Eric Posner, Tom Ward, and the participants at a faculty workshop at Notre Dame
Law School for helpful comments; and to Bruce Green and the editors of the Ford-
ham Law Review for inviting me to participate in this symposium.
1. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). The 1800 Act lasted
three years. See Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 (repealing Act of Apr. 4, 1800,
ch.19, 2 Stat. 19).
2. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). The 1841 Act lasted
less than two years. See Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (repealing Act of Aug.
19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440).
3. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). The 1867 Act lasted
eleven years. See Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99 (repealing Act of Mar. 2,
1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517).
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
5. Unlike the prior amendments, the Chandler Act of 1938 completely over-
hauled the 1898 Act. Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
6. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C.). This Article uses "Bankruptcy Code" to refer to the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
7. The most prominent book-length discussions of bankruptcy history are Peter J.
Coleman, Debtors and Creditors in America: Insolvency, Imprisonment for Debt,
and Bankruptcy, 1607-1900 (1974); F. Regis Noel, A History Of The Bankruptcy
Clause of the Constitution of the United States of America (1919); and Charles War-
ren, Bankruptcy In United States History (1935). For an excellent overview in article
form, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5 (1995) (providing a chronological review of bank-
ruptcy law, with some consideration of associated constitutional issues).
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This Article begins by arguing that a pivotal factor was the bank-
ruptcy bar.8 This does not mean that the bankruptcy bar cleverly
pushed through the 1898 Act for its own benefit. Actually, the story is
much more interesting. When the Act was passed in 1898, there had
not been a federal bankruptcy law for twenty years, and the bank-
ruptcy bar did not even exist. At that time, commercial organizations,
not lawyers, were the principal proponents of bankruptcy law. Be-
cause administrative costs were seen by many as the biggest problem
with the previous bankruptcy law,9 the drafters of the Act pared down
the administrative apparatus to an absolute minimum in 1898.10 This
left much more room for bankruptcy lawyers than might otherwise
have been the case; and once the bankruptcy bar emerged, the bar
itself played a crucial role in stabilizing the new legislation.
This, then, was the magic of the 1898 Act: the Act created the
bankruptcy bar, and the bar then reinforced the coalition of commer-
cial interests that had agitated for bankruptcy legislation. It is only a
slight overstatement to say that the feedback effect between the Act
and the bar was the defining event in American bankruptcy law.
And it was only the beginning. The bankruptcy bar not only helped
to assure the permanence of American bankruptcy law; the bar also
has had an enormous influence on the Act's subsequent development.
Other interest groups, from lenders and other creditors to debtors and
potential debtors, have always had a big stake, too. Collective action
problems and related considerations, however, have limited the influ-
ence of unsecured creditors and debtors. Although banks and other
lenders are not similarly constrained, their priority status and ability
to adjust their interest rates in response to debtor-friendly bankruptcy
laws limit the range of issues they are concerned with. As a result, no
other group has had nearly so pervasive an impact on bankruptcy law
as the bankruptcy bar. Bankruptcy lawyers' influence on the evolu-
tion of bankruptcy law is, in a sense, the rest of the story of bank-
ruptcy in the United States.
Part I of this Article describes the transition from episodic, short-
lived nineteenth century bankruptcy laws to a lasting law in 1898. Af-
ter arguing that bankruptcy's early instability stemmed from a voting
dilemma known as "cycling" in the social choice literature, the article
8. This Article uses "bankruptcy bar" as a general term encompassing bank-
ruptcy lawyers, bankruptcy judges and other bankruptcy professionals, and academ-
ics. For many decades, bankruptcy judges (originally called "referees") carried on
active law practices in addition to their judicial responsibilities. Now, as then, bank-
ruptcy judges are drawn from the ranks of bankruptcy lawyers, and their interests
continue to parallel those of the bar in most respects. Academics' interests are more
diverse, but the perspectives of most also tend to track those of some portion of the
bar.
9. See Warren, supra note 7, at 127-28.
10. For citations from the legislative history underscoring this concern, see infra
Part I.
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demonstrates how the 1898 Act created an acute need for bankruptcy
lawyers. These lawyers played a crucial role in stabilizing the Act.
Part II explores in more detail why bankruptcy lawyers have had so
great an influence on bankruptcy law, as compared to other interest
groups. Part III then considers the specific ways that bankruptcy law-
yers have altered the course of bankruptcy law. The analysis focuses
in particular on bankruptcy lawyers' repeated opposition to proposals
to create a bankruptcy administrator, and their success in continually
expanding the scope of bankruptcy law. Their lobbying effect has cre-
ated an ex post bias in American creditor-debtor relations that is not
likely to change anytime soon.
This Article focuses, throughout, on the emergence and influence of
the general bankruptcy bar, which for many years was limited to the
bankruptcies of individuals and small businesses. Prior to the 1930s,
corporate reorganization took place wholly outside the bankruptcy
laws, and was the domain of an elite group of New York firms."
Much as the 1898 Act created the need for a general bankruptcy bar,
equity receivership stimulated the growth of the reorganization bar,
which led in turn to the first major American law firms. 2 The analysis
will allude to the reorganization bar at various points (especially in
discussing the New Deal reforms of the 1930s, which brought the two
bars together), but the heart of the story concerns the less glamorous
but enormously influential general bankruptcy bar.
I. THE PATH TO A PERMANENT BANKRUPTCY LAW
Unlike the recent politics of bankruptcy, nineteenth century bank-
ruptcy debates were extraordinarily colorful. Opponents of bank-
ruptcy included Thomas Jefferson early in the century, and John
Calhoun for decades thereafter.13 On the other side, Daniel Webster
delivered impassioned speeches in support of national bankruptcy leg-
islation.' 4 For much of the century, neither position reigned supreme.
The status of bankruptcy shifted repeatedly, with short-lived bank-
ruptcy laws repeatedly giving way to longer periods during which
there was no federal bankruptcy law.15
11. The corporate reorganization bar and the equity receivership device the bar
used to reorganize troubled firms are discussed in detail in David A. Skeel, Jr., An
Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L Rev.
(forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory)].
12. The leading reorganization firm was one most lawyers will recognize: Cravath,
Swaine & Moore. For a discussion of the firm's rise, which was fueled in large part by
its role in the early railroad reorganizations, see 2 Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath
Firm and Its Predecessors: 1819-1948 (1948).
13. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 7, at 16 (noting Jefferson's opposition as early as
1792); id. at 61-62 (explaining that Calhoun opposed the 1841 Act).
14. See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting that Webster proposed bankruptcy legislation in
1824).
15. For the dates of the nineteenth century bankruptcy laws, see supra notes 1-4.
1998]
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According to the traditional account, these events can be distilled to
a single, recurring pattern: during severe economic downturns, Con-
gress responded by enacting bankruptcy legislation; but when good
times returned, Congress repealed its earlier handiwork.16 Thus, the
four nineteenth century bankruptcy laws-1800, 1841, 1867, and
1898-came during periods of notable economic distress, and the first
three were repealed once the immediate crisis was over.
Like most canonical accounts, the good times/bad times view of
nineteenth century bankruptcy law is loosely accurate. But (again,
like most widely-accepted views) it also raises a variety of puzzles.
For present purposes, the most important is this: if bankruptcy laws
arrived in bad times and left in good ones, why did this pattern sud-
denly stop in 1898? Congress continued, and continues, to alter the
federal bankruptcy laws; but since 1898, there has always been a bank-
ruptcy law in place. Why did bankruptcy laws finally become
permanent?
A number of obvious answers suggest themselves (that the expan-
sion of interstate commerce made federal bankruptcy law crucial; that
the earliest bankruptcy laws were temporary by design), but none is
particularly satisfying. One can imagine a world without federal bank-
ruptcy, 17 for instance, and the 1898 Act was not the only bankruptcy
law designed for permanence-the 1867 Act had had the same
aspirations.'
This Article proposes an alternative way of looking at the nine-
teenth century bankruptcy debates. For much of the nineteenth cen-
tury, legislators held, in the language of social choice theory, cyclical
or nearly cyclical preferences on bankruptcy law, as reflected in the
remarkable instability of legislative outcomes. The bankruptcy bar
was both a beneficiary and a cause of the stability that emerged in
1898. Since then, bankruptcy lawyers have served as an ongoing
source of "structure-induced equilibrium"19 in bankruptcy law.
The argument is not nearly so complex as I have made it sound thus
far. To see this, we should briefly consider the phenomenon of cycling
and the social choice literature it has spawned.2" We then can explore
its application to bankruptcy in more detail.
16. See Warren, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that "every bankruptcy law has been the
product of some financial crisis or business depression").
17. For an argument that Congress could improve corporate bankruptcy by shift-
ing authority back to the states, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994).
18. See Warren, supra note 7, at 109 (recognizing that the 1867 Act was "signifi-
cant in being the first bill constructed as a permanent piece of legislation").
19. As discussed below, the term "structure-induced equilibrium" comes from
Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and Legis-
lative Choice, 37 Pub. Choice 503, 512 (1981).
20. For a more detailed discussion (and extensive citations), see David A. Skeel,
Jr., The Unanimity Norm In Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127 (1997)
[hereinafter Skeel, The Unanimity Norm]. See also David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice
500 [Vol. 67
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Under most circumstances, we quickly can select a winner from
three or more options by holding a series of pairwise votes that pit
each option against each of the alternatives. But sometimes three or
more decision makers hold preferences that are so inconsistent (more
precisely, they are "multipeaked") 2' that attempts to aggregate the
decision makers' preferences lead not to a stable outcome, but to a
voting "cycle." Here is an illustration. Suppose that three friends
wish to go out, and they agree to choose among three possible op-
tions: going to the art museum ("Art"), going to a basketball game
("Basketball"), or attending a concert ("Concert"). Friend 1 ranks
the choices as follows: Art, Basketball, Concert; Friend 2 ranks them:
Basketball, Concert, Art; and Friend 3's ordering is: Concert, Art,
Basketball.
The problem is that the friends do not clearly prefer any one of the
three options over the other two. Thus, Friends 1 and 3 prefer Art
over Basketball; but Friends 2 and 3 prefer Concert over Art; and
Friends 1 and 2 prefer Basketball over Concert. On inspection, it
quickly becomes apparent that, for any option that a majority (two) of
the friends prefer, there is another option that a different majority
prefers. Were the friends to hold a series of majority votes on the
options, their choice would continually change-that is, their choice
would cycle.
Although the intuition behind cycling goes back several centuries,'
it took on particular importance after Kenneth Arrow demonstrated
that no voting institution can both satisfy a series of fairness require-
ments and, at the same time, guarantee that it will always produce a
rational outcome.' This insight, known as Arrow's Theorem, has
breathtaking implications for voting institutions such as Congress.
While high school civics classes depict Congress as the pillar of de-
mocracy, operating on the basis of orderly majority votes, Arrow's
Theorem suggests a different picture. As with all voting institutions,
and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 Vand. L Rev. 647
(1997) [hereinafter Skeel, Public Choice] (reviewing Maxwell L. Stearns, Public
Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary (1997)).
21. Preferences are multipeaked if they cannot be plotted as a single-peaked curve
on a graph. See, &g., William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confronta-
tion Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 123-28
(1988) (discussing Arrow's Theorem and its practical significance).
22. One of the first to wrestle with this voting dilemma was the eighteenth century
French mathematician The Marquis de Condorcet. See Maxwell L Stearns, Public
Choice and Public Law: Readings And Commentary at mxi (1997).
23. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963). Ar-
row defined an outcome as "rational" if it satisfies the conditions of transitivity. Id. at
3. (Thus, if voters prefer choice A to choice B, and choice B to choice C, the outcome
is rational if choice A defeats choice C). The fairness requirements, as distilled from
Arrow's analysis by subsequent commentators, are: unlimited range, independence of
irrelevant alternatives, nondictatorship, universality, and unanimity, or the Pareto
postulate. For an explanation of each requirement, and citations to the literature, see
Skeel, The Unanimity Nonn, supra note 20, at 142 nA8.
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congressional voting may be deeply unstable due to cycling and re-
lated problems.
As they considered the implications of Arrow's Theorem for Con-
gress, a number of commentators noted that, in practice, one rarely
sees voting cycles of the sort that the theorem warns about. These
theorists, therefore, began to ask why congressional voting had proven
so stable. 4 How does Congress prevent or solve the problem of cycli-
cal voting?
For the purposes of this article, two answers stand out. First, cycling
will only occur if lawmakers (or other decision makers) hold mul-
tipeaked preferences. If lawmakers agree about the general arrange-
ment of the options, they may hold unipeaked preferences even if
they sharply disagree over which choice is best. When lawmakers
view the options as ranging from liberal to conservative, for instance,
and vote accordingly, their preferences will not cycle.2 5 Second, Ar-
row's Theorem assumes, among other things, that no individual con-
trols the voting process and voters are free at all times to vote for any
of the possible options; that is, the theorem assumes pure democratic
voting.2 6 Relaxing these assumptions may reduce or eliminate the risk
of cycling, 7 even if lawmakers do in fact hold cyclical preferences.
Several commentators demonstrated that Congress employs a variety
of voting rules that have precisely this effect, and tend to produce
"structure-induced equilibrium."28 Limitations on lawmakers' ability
to offer amendments and the agenda control that Congressional com-
mittees enjoy are prominent examples. Both rules enhance stability
by replacing truly democratic voting with a more restricted voting
structure.
To a remarkable extent, bankruptcy history reflects each of these
social choice insights. For much of the nineteenth century, lawmakers
held cyclical-or nearly cyclical-preferences as to the desirability of
bankruptcy law. As commentators have noted, there were at least
three distinct views on bankruptcy issues.29 One group of lawmakers
(principally Southern lawmakers) were sharply opposed to passing
any bankruptcy law-they insisted that insolvency issues should be
24. Gordon Tlillock provoked much of the debate with a widely-cited article. See
Gordon ThIlock, Why So Much Stability?, 37 Pub. Choice 189 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Riker, supra note 21, at 124 (noting the absence of cycling if prefer-
ences are unipeaked). Under unipeaked voting, outcomes will gravitate toward the
views of the median voter. This outcome will remain stable so long as the preferences
of the relevant decision makers do not change. For an extensive discussion (and qual-
ifications), see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice I (1989).
26. See Arrow, supra note 23, at 6-8.
27. There is a cost to this, however: Limiting voters' options tends to diminish the
perceived fairness of the voting process.
28. See Shepsle & Weingast, supra note 19, at 507-14.
29. Warren chronicles the debates among lawmakers holding each of the views in
detail. See Warren, supra note 7, at 103. For simplicity, I have condensed Warren's
typology from four views to three.
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left to the states.3" A second group of lawmakers (mostly Northern
lawmakers) believed that federal bankruptcy legislation was essential
to the American economy.31 Still another group was willing to vote
for bankruptcy legislation, but only if the law was limited to voluntary
bankruptcy-that is, it did not give creditors the right to force a
debtor into bankruptcy against her vill.32
As we have just seen, the existence of three distinct views does not
by itself raise the specter of cycling. If lawmakers agreed that no
bankruptcy law was one polar view, voluntary-only bankruptcy was
the middle view, and expansive bankruptcy (including both voluntary
and involuntary components) was the other extreme, their preferences
would be unipeaked.33 In reality, this appears not to have been the
case. Some lawmakers whose first choice was no bankruptcy law, for
instance, preferred expansive bankruptcy rather than voluntary bank-
ruptcy as a second choice.'
The most dramatic illustration of voting instabilities, and possible
cycling, on bankruptcy issues was the Bankruptcy Act of 1841.11 In
1840, the Whigs had won the presidency on a platform that placed
particular emphasis on the need for bankruptcy legislation. One year
later, they achieved this goal through a logroll that involved unusually
blatant vote trading.36 But the legislation quickly proved unpopular,
and within a few months the coalition supporting it had fallen apart.37
Congress repealed the 1841 Act in 1843,38 once again giving the upper
hand to the lawmakers who opposed federal bankruptcy legislation.39
By the final decades of the nineteenth century, when this pattern
finally came to an end, the expansion of interstate commerce had
broadened the support for federal bankruptcy legislation somewhat.
30. Early in the century, opponents of bankruptcy often framed their objection in
constitutional terms, arguing that the Constitution allows only "bankruptcy" laws, as
distinguished from "insolvency" laws. See id. at 7. The Supreme Court rejected this
distinction, which derived from earlier English jurisprudence, in Sturges v. Crosvin-
shield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 129 (1819).
31. Daniel Webster and Joseph Story were the most prominent proponents of this
view. See Warren, supra note 7, at 55-60.
32. See id. at 103.
33. As noted earlier, the median view would tend to prevail under these circum-
stances. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. See Warren, supra note 7, at 103-04 (describing factions): see also infra note 48
(describing conflicts within coalitions as chronicled in house reports prior to 1898
Act).
35. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3. 1843, ch. 82,
5 Stat. 614.
36. See Warren, supra note 7, at 76-77.
37. The Whig party, which had invested enormous political capital to secure the
passage of the 1841 Act, was disappointed by the public response, and later partici-
pated in the movement to repeal it. See id. at 83-84.
38. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614.
39. For evidence of coalitional instabilities in connection with the 1898 Act, see
infra note 48 (noting coalition shifts on Judiciary Committee in 1893 as reflected in
house reports).
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With commercial enterprise expanding into the South and West, these
regions were less monolithically opposed to bankruptcy than in the
past. The most important outgrowth of this was the emergence
throughout the nation of commercial trade organizations, one of
which, the National Convention of Representatives of Commercial
Bodies, drafted and served as the principal advocate of the 1898 Act.40
To enhance the political viability of bankruptcy legislation, its pro-
ponents limited its scope in two important ways. First, rather than
regulating a debtor's exemptions (that is, the property the debtor can
exclude from the bankruptcy estate) directly, the Act simply incorpo-
rated state exemption law.41 The beauty of this approach to exemp-
tions, which was constitutionally suspect until 1902,42 was that it gave
state lawmakers a substantial say in how their debtors were treated.
The second, and more pivotal attribute of the proposals that led to
the 1898 Act, was the approach to bankruptcy administration. The
administrative costs of the prior act had made it widely unpopular, 43
so the commercial organizations pushing for bankruptcy reform knew
that they had to keep costs as low as possible.44 To minimize costs and
address concerns about the federalizing effect of bankruptcy, the ad-
ministrative apparatus was pared down to an absolute minimum.45
40. For an insightful analysis of commercial associations' role in securing the 1898
Act, see Bradley Hansen, Commercial Associations and the Creation of a National
Economy: The Demand For Federal Bankruptcy Law, 72 Bus. Hist. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 1998) [hereinafter Hansen, Commercial Associations].
41. The 1867 Act had also incorporated state exemptions, but only those enacted
before 1864. See Noel, supra note 7, at 152. The retroactive feature was aimed at
Southern states, whom Northern lawmakers suspected would abuse the state exemp-
tion-making prerogative. See Warren, supra note 7, at 103 (noting that incorporation
of state exemptions was crucial to Western support); see also Tabb, supra note 7, at 20
(stating that the incorporation of state exemptions was an important benefit to debt-
ors of the 1867 Act).
42. The Bankruptcy Clause in the Constitution requires that bankruptcy laws be
"uniform," and many observers believed that this precluded Congress from incorpo-
rating diverse state exemption laws. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. In Hanover Na-
tional Bank v. Moyses, the Supreme Court finally put these concerns to rest, holding
that the Uniformity Clause required only "geographical" uniformity, not "personal"
uniformity. 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
43. The administration of the 1867 Act proved costly for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding the necessity of conducting the process before an often inconvenient federal
court, and the fees generated by the examiners and other officials provided for by the
Act. See, e.g., Noel, supra note 7, at 153 (discussing federal courts); Warren, supra
note 7, at 127 (discussing excessive costs and unbearable fees).
44. This concern is immediately apparent in the congressional reports issued dur-
ing the debates leading up to the 1898 Act, which were at pains to show that the new
legislation would not (or according to opponents, would) be as cumbersome as the
1867 Act. But see, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 52-1674, at 7-8 (1892) (minority report) (claim-
ing that proposed bill required just as many officials; it simply changed their names).
45. Southern lawmakers were especially apprehensive, since they and their con-
stituents viewed the federal judges who had implemented the 1867 Act as unwelcome
carpetbaggers. See Warren, supra note 7, at 127.
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Most cases would require, at most, a "referee" to act as judge, and a
bankruptcy trustee.46
Even with all these adjustments, the 1898 Act was far from pre-
ordained. Starting in 1881, proponents introduced it year after year,
and often secured favorable votes from either the House or Senate.47
But lawmakers continued to hold multiple, inconsistent views on the
legislation,' and for a variety of reasons, it repeatedly fell short. Only
when the Republican party controlled the presidency and both houses
of Congress did the 1898 Act finally become the law of the land.49
The Act's staying power derived, quite accidentally, from the mini-
malist administrative structure its proponents had been forced to
adopt. With no federal administrator to oversee the process, and no
full-time officials of any kind,5" the principal players were the parties
and their lawyers. Bankruptcy lawyers quickly rushed into the vac-
uum in most cities, and soon had a large stake in the survival of the
Act. Continued Republican control kept the law in place long enough
for the bar to develop. Bankruptcy lawyers, together with the credi-
tors that had originally proposed the Act, then served the principal
bulwark against repeal.
The legislative history contains tantalizing evidence of the emerging
influence of the bankruptcy bar. In the years leading up to the 1898
Act, lawyers played a very limited role in lobbying for or against pro-
posed legislation. The speeches and memoranda that appear in the
records almost uniformly come from lawmakers, trade groups, and or-
46. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 47-1401, at 2 (1882) (enumerating revised bankruptcy
procedures). But see H.R. Rep. No. 52-1674, at 7-8 (1892) (minority report) (com-
plaining that the 1892 version of the legislation merely changed the names of the
officials from "register" and "assignee" to "referee" and "'trustee"). Although early
drafts of the legislation had provided for salaried referees, the final version paid them
on a fee basis. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 40, 30 Stat. 544, 556 (repealed
1978). Not until 1946 did Congress finally shift to a salary approach.
47. For a brief review, see Proceedings of National Association of Credit Men, S.
Doc. No. 55-156, at 1-2 (1898).
48. The legislative reports offer a fascinating window on the unstable shifts among
coalitions. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 53-67. at 1 (1893) (minority report) (noting that
minority members disagree whether there should be any bankruptcy law, but agree
that there should not be a law providing for involuntary bankruptcy): H.R. Rep. No.
53-206, at 1-2 (1893) (additional report) (stating that the majority includes some who
favor voluntary-only law, and some who would prefer universal bankruptcy but think
it is not politically feasible).
49. See Brad Hansen, The Political Economy of Bankruptcy: The 1898 Act to Es-
tablish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy of 1898 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (arguing that political alignment led to 1898 Act, rather
than economic depression as claimed by the traditional theory). Hansen also empha-
sizes the role that creditors' groups played in spearheading and promoting the legisla-
tion. See id.; see also Hansen, Commercial Associations. supra note 40 (discussing the
role of creditor organizations in the development of 1898 Act).
50. Recall that even the bankruptcy judges (called referees) were paid fees rather
than salaries, and most served only part-time.
19981
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ganizations such as the chamber of commerce.5' Once the 1898 Act
was in place, however, lawyers assumed an increasingly prominent
role in the debates. Within a few years, the debates on proposals to
amend or repeal the Act were dominated by bankruptcy lawyers and
references to their interest in the bankruptcy law. 52
In social choice terms, the emergence of a bankruptcy bar created a
structure-induced equilibrium that reinforced the influence of com-
mercial organizations, and made it all but impossible to eliminate (or
even sharply curtail) federal bankruptcy law. Absent the input of law-
yers, the views of lawmakers and their constituents might have contin-
ued to cycle, with some preferring no bankruptcy legislation, others
preferring voluntary only, and still others supporting expansive bank-
ruptcy.53 But bankruptcy lawyers quickly became such a broad-based
and influential interest group, that their presence precluded the possi-
bility of eliminating federal bankruptcy law altogether.
As a historical matter, this article may seem to overstate the stabi-
lizing effect that bankruptcy lawyers have had on federal bankruptcy
law. After all, the adoption of permanent bankruptcy legislation oc-
curred during roughly the same time period as Congressional lawmak-
ing had stabilized in many other areas due, among other things, to
Congress's increasing reliance on committees.54 These factors no
doubt contributed to the unprecedented durability of the 1898 Act.5
But they cannot have been the principal factor. The Judiciary Com-
mittee's influence as the gatekeeper for bankruptcy legislation pre-
51. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 54-237 (1896) (assembling newspaper clippings support-
ing the proposed legislation, and memorials from local boards of trade and chambers
of commerce).
52. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13266 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 60th
Cong. 31, 41 (1908) (statement of George Whitelock, American Bar Association on
Commercial Law) (explaining that the ABA opposes any proposal to repeal or evis-
cerate the Act); H.R. Rep. No. 57-1698, at 2-3 (1902) (minority report) (arguing for
repeal and listing bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy professionals as advocating re-
tention of the existing law).
53. An alternative possibility is that lobbying by bankruptcy lawyers altered
lawmakers' preferences, rather than simply masking preferences that otherwise would
have continued to cycle. The effect is the same either way: bankruptcy lawyers gave
bankruptcy a stability it had previously lacked.
54. Although Congress began to establish committees early in the nineteenth cen-
tury, it was not until much later that committees were given the often-exclusive
gatekeeping authority we associate with them now. Because the relevant oversight
committee can prevent an issue from being reconsidered, committees provide stability
even when lawmakers' preferences are unstable. See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & Wil-
liam J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like
Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. Pol. Econ. 132, 143-48 (1988) (discussing
the influence of committees).
55. Other important factors included the incorporation of state exemptions, as dis-
cussed earlier, and the fact that commercial creditors continued to support the Act
despite its relatively lenient discharge of debtors.
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dated the 1898 Act by many years, 6 for instance, which raises doubts
as to whether committee structure played an important role in the
Act's permanence. More importantly, the Judiciary Committee came
out in favor of repeal during the infancy of the ActY
Much more than committee structure or other possible factors, it
was bankruptcy lawyers who solidified the coalition in support of fed-
eral bankruptcy legislation. It is lawyers we have to thank for the long
life and, even more, the shape of bankruptcy law.
II. WHY ARE BANKRUPTCY LAWYERS So INFLUENTIAL?
What has been shown thus far is that the 1898 Act had the effect of
creating a bankruptcy bar, and that bankruptcy lawyers have played a
prominent role in bankruptcy legislation ever since. This elicits an im-
portant question, of course: why is it that bankruptcy lawyers, rather
than some other interest group, are the principal influence on bank-
ruptcy law? To answer this question, we will start from an interest
group perspective,5 8 then briefly consider some of the other factors
that come into play when lawmakers talk about bankruptcy.
Even a simplified list of the groups who are affected by bankruptcy
would include at least four different interests. In addition to debtors,
nondebtors also have a stake in the existence or nonexistence of bank-
ruptcy. Secured creditors-that is, creditors who hold collateralized
obligations-are a third group; and (as we have seen) unsecured cred-
itors such as suppliers are a fourth.5 9 Thus, bankruptcy lawyers are
hardly alone when it comes to bankruptcy. But even a brief inspec-
tion makes clear that none of these groups has both the power and the
incentive to eliminate or sharply curtail the scope of bankruptcy.
Consider first the perspective of debtors. Debtors and potential
debtors may benefit if there is a generous bankruptcy law in place.
But any future changes are unlikely to affect the bankruptcies of cur-
rent debtors;6° although reform does affect future debtors, such debt-
56. The Judiciary Committee had exercised jurisdiction over bankruptcy since the
early nineteenth century. See Lauros G. McConachie, Congressional Committees 213
(1973) (describing the formation of the Judiciary Committee in 1813 and the scope of
its jurisdiction).
57. See H.R. Rep. No. 58-4397 (1905) (advocating repeal).
58. Interest group analysis assumes that organized interest groups exercise dispro-
portionate influence over legislative outcomes, because they-unlike general voters-
participate actively in the legislative process. For a more detailed overview, see Skeel,
Public Choice, supra note 20, at 651-52.
59. In corporate bankruptcy, organized labor has also figured prominently from
time-to-time, most recently in the debates that prompted Congress to pass 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113, which regulates collective bargaining in bankruptcy. A wide range of other
groups also have left their mark on isolated sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
60. Bankruptcy reform during the Great Depression was, in a sense, the exception
that proves the rule. A few corporate debtors, particularly railroads, did lobby in the
hope that reform would influence their cases. See Skeel, An Evolutionary Theory,
supra note 11, at 53-63. But their numbers were quite small and their participation
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ors nevertheless exert little influence in the legislative process. Many
potential debtors do not realize that they are likely to wind up in
bankruptcy; and even if they did, both collective action problems6'
and the disinclination to announce their financial distress to the world
make their participation unlikely.
Unlike debtors, nondebtors do not profit from expansive bank-
ruptcy protection. Because a nondebtor's creditors will charge higher
interest rates or restrict credit if bankruptcy offers an easy escape
from credit obligations, nondebtors fare better if bankruptcy is strictly
limited. 62 Yet, nondebtors face even more of a collective action prob-
lem than debtors do. The benefits of reform are sufficiently small, and
the costs of direct involvement sufficiently high, that nondebtors have
little incentive to participate in the development of bankruptcy law.
And for the most part, they do not. The only exception to this is the
occasional participation of organizations-such as local chambers of
commerce-whose membership includes many nondebtors; and even
these organizations often see themselves principally as creditors
rather than nondebtors.63
One group that does lobby actively is secured creditors, such as
banks.6' Because they hold large claims, both in the aggregate and in
individual cases, banks do not face the kinds of severe collective ac-
tion problems that undermine debtor and nondebtor participation. 65
Banks, therefore, are well-situated to counterbalance the influence of
lawyers on the shape of bankruptcy law. Banks do, in fact, play this
role, yet their interests are limited in crucial respects. Because se-
cured creditors have priority both inside bankruptcy and out, secured
creditors are not so concerned about large issues such as the restric-
tiveness or generosity of bankruptcy law-or even whether bank-
ruptcy law should be retained or repealed. Their principal concern is
limited. Individual debtors did not lobby at all, although lawmakers clearly took their
perceived interests into account.
61. Because potential debtors are widely scattered, and each has a relatively small
stake in bankruptcy reform, they cannot organize effectively. See generally Mancur
Olson, Jr., The Logic Of Collective Action (1965) (finding that large groups are un-
likely to act collectively absent "selective incentives" that facilitate organization).
62. In effect, nondebtors subsidize debtors if creditors cannot easily distinguish
between the two ex ante, since creditors will raise their interest rates on all loans to
compensate for the expected cost of debtors' defaults.
63. The chambers of commerce who lobbied for the 1898 Act emphasized that
bankruptcy legislation would enhance business by curbing debtor fraud and providing
a consistent response to financial distress.
64. Although I focus in this paragraph on banks' role as secured lenders, most
banks also lend on an unsecured basis (and even their secured loans are often un-
dercollaterized). In their role as unsecured creditors, banks' interests are somewhat
similar to the unsecured creditors discussed subsequently.
65. Bankers lobby actively through organizations such as the American Bankers
Association. Other kinds of financial institutions are similarly active. For a descrip-
tion in the context of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, see Eric A. Posner, The Political
Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 55 (1997).
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to assure that the bankruptcy process is as smooth as possible, lest
their recovery be diminished by administrative and other costs.'
The final group is small unsecured creditors. Because debtors are
almost always insolvent when they file for bankruptcy67 and un-
secured creditors do not enjoy priority, these creditors have a more
pervasive interest in the shape of bankruptcy law. Indeed, in corpo-
rate bankruptcy there is a strong argument that unsecured creditors
have the best perspective of any constituency. They, after all, are the
ones who benefit most if a debtor's troubles are resolved efficiently,
and suffer the most from inefficiency.'
Although unsecured creditors played a central role in the 1898 Act,
and still lobby actively from time to time, their current influence is
much weaker than one might predict. Part of the explanation for this
is that unsecured creditors, like debtors and nondebtors, face collec-
tive action problems. But this cannot be the principal explanation,
since many unsecured creditors are repeat players in bankruptcy-a
supplier can expect a number of its customers to file for bankruptcy at
some point, for instance-and unsecured creditors are represented by
trade groups and other organizations.69
Rather than collective action problems, the biggest reason for un-
secured creditor silence is that is that creditors can "price out" many
(though not all) of the effects of an efficient or inefficient bankruptcy
regime in the credit terms they offer to debtors. If bankruptcy is gen-
erous, creditors can charge higher interest rates, and they can reduce
these rates where there is a stricter regime.70 In view of this, un-
secured creditors worry a lot about the magnitude of transition ef-
fects-how much is at stake with credit they have already extended-
and not so much about the effect on future loans. The few instances
66. Banks may also take an active interest with respect to issues that affect their
market share vis-t-vis other kinds of lenders. See, eg., Peter V. Letsou, The Political
Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 Emory LJ. 587, 644-48 (1995) (describ-
ing competition between banks and finance companies).
67. Unlike prior bankruptcy law, the 1978 Code does not require insolvency as a
prerequisite for filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (de-
fining who may qualify as a "debtor" under each chapter of the Code).
68. I and other commentators have made this point at length elsewhere. See, e.g.,
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorgan-
ization Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 461, 494 (1992) (proposing greater unsecured creditor
control over several Chapter 11 voting issues).
69. A large number of these trade groups participated in the legislative process
during the New Deal, especially in the earliest hearings. See, e.g., Joint Hearings on S.
3866 Before tre Subcomnm. on tire Judiciary, 72d Cong. 428 (1932) [hereinafter 1932
Hearings] (statement of R.P. Shealey, Washington counsel for the National Retail
Credit Association); id. at 432 (statement of William Funk, Director, National Gro-
cers' Association).
70. Not all creditors have this ability. Tort creditors, for instance, are notoriously
unable to take such steps. Unfortunately, these creditors tend to be the ones who do
face serious collective action problems and therefore play almost no role as lobbyists.
See generally Neil Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives 171-77 (1994) (discussing inability
of potential tort claimants to lobby).
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when unsecured creditors have made their voices heard have tended
to be at times when there were substantial transition effects at stake.7'
Credit card companies' recent push to tighten consumer bankruptcy in
the wake of unprecedented numbers of filings is a particularly dra-
matic illustration of this.
To summarize: of the four groups we have considered, secured
creditors exert the most influence, but they have relatively narrow in-
terests due to their priority status. Quite counterintuitively, debtors
and nondebtors are nearly silent, with unsecured creditors participat-
ing more often, but much less than one might predict.
Contrast this to bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy professionals,
such as judges. Because their livelihood depends on it, bankruptcy
lawyers have an enormous interest in all aspects of bankruptcy law.
Although bankruptcy lawyers are not immune to collective action
problems-bankruptcy lawyers often choose not to participate in the
lobbying process, in the hope they can freeride on the efforts of
others-many bankruptcy lawyers derive experience and reputational
benefits from active involvement. 72 Bankruptcy lawyers also have
long been represented by collective organizations such as the National
Bankruptcy Conference, the Commercial Law League and, more re-
cently, the American Bankruptcy Institute.73
It is misleading to speak of the bankruptcy bar as if it were mono-
lithic, of course. Bankruptcy lawyers represent clients, and each law-
yer or firm tends to represent a particular set of interests: most
broadly, either debtors or creditors. If bankruptcy lawyers were per-
fect agents for their debtor or creditor clients, their influence on bank-
ruptcy legislation would be laudable, because the competing interests
of the lawyers would largely mirror the competing perspectives of
71. Unsecured creditors' roles in the 1898 Act and in the Depression appear to fit
this pattern. Not only were the transition effects relatively large at both times-espe-
cially in the Depression, with the vast numbers of failing debtors-but unsecured
creditor lobbying (with the important exceptions of the National Association of
Credit Men and in recent years the credit card lobby) dwindled after the early New
Deal.
72. Thus, prominent lawyers such as Kenneth Klee and Harvey Miller who partici-
pated actively in the enactment of the 1978 Code have derived enormous professional
benefits from their participation.
73. The Commercial Law League is the oldest of the organizations, dating back to
the turn of the century. A group of bankruptcy lawyers and academics formed the
National Bankruptcy Conference in the 1930s in an effort to promote further reform,
and it has played a central role in bankruptcy legislation ever since. The American
Bankruptcy Institute emerged most recently, in the bankruptcy boom years of the
1980s.
Similarly, bankruptcy judges have been represented since 1926 by the National As-
sociation of Referees in Bankruptcy-now called the National Association of Bank-
ruptcy Judges. See Paul H. King, Letter, 1 J. Nat'l Ass'n Ref. Bankr. 1 (1926)
(announcing formation).
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those affected by bankruptcy.74 Thus, debtors' silence would be little
cause for concern, since debtors' lawyers would fully represent their
interests; and creditors' lawyers would do the same for secured and
unsecured creditors.
Bankruptcy lawyers do further their clients' interests on some is-
sues, but in at least one crucial way they may not: all bankruptcy law-
yers have an interest in increasing the use of bankruptcy.7" Even if
creditors would benefit from restrictions on, or elimination of, bank-
ruptcy, a creditors' lawyer might nevertheless discourage such meas-
ures if less bankruptcy meant fewer clients. We will explore these
issues further below, but for now the important point is that we cannot
simply assume that bankruptcy lawyers' interests will mirror those of
their clients.
Given how broad a brush this Article has used thus far, it should be
noted that one could complicate (and add nuance to) the interest
group analysis in a variety of ways. One could, for instance, consider
the differing perspectives of the House and Senate on bankruptcy re-
form. 7 6 But the general theme-that bankruptcy lawyers play an
enormously influential role-would remain the same.
Factors other than interest group pressure also can affect the legisla-
tive process in crucial ways. Of these, the most important is ideology,
which has long figured prominently in bankruptcy.' The nineteenth
century bankruptcy debates frequently raised issues such as the moral-
ity of bankruptcy-whether it is appropriate to discharge one's
debts.78 In recent decades, there have been frequent ideological de-
bates over how lenient bankruptcy should be, but there is a broad
consensus in favor of bankruptcy,7 9 with bankruptcy often being de-
bated in technical, non-ideological terms. Almost no one has seri-
ously argued that the federal bankruptcy laws should be repealed
74. The correlation still would not be perfect, because nondebtors' interests only
would be represented if non-bankruptcy lawyers also influenced the legislative
process.
75. This is not intended to impugn lawyers' motives in any way. Most bankruptcy
lawyers fully believe that the positions they take are the best overall for everyone.
But the positions they take also tend to correlate with the interests of lawyers.
76. This is a particular concern of Eric Posner's analysis of the political economy
of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. Posner concludes, among other things, that the debate
over whether to give bankruptcy judges Article III status was influenced by
lawmakers' interest in patronage opportunities. See Posner, supra note 65. at 85-90.
77. For a discussion of ideology's role in corporate bankruptcy, see Skeel, An Evo-
lutionary Theory, supra note 11, at 41-42.
78. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 7, at 62 (noting that Thomas H. Benton com-
plained that a bankruptcy law would "teach the rising generation a facile way to get
rid of their obligations").
79. Thus, creditors have argued strenuously that more debtors should be directed
into Chapter 13, which requires debtors to contribute their disposable income for
three to five years to a wage earner plan. But no one has suggested that Congress
should repeal the federal bankruptcy laws.
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altogether."0 Thus, ideology tends to reinforce bankruptcy lawyers'
interest in an expansive bankruptcy regime. Moreover, the complex-
ity of bankruptcy law is likely to give the bankruptcy bar even more
influence than they would have if the effects of bankruptcy reform
were more obvious to the general public."
III. WHAT SHAPE DOES THE INFLUENCE TAKE?
In arguing that bankruptcy lawyers exert particular influence, this
Article has suggested that their interests sometimes do, but sometimes
do not, parallel those of their clients. The final issue needed to be
considered is this: how have bankruptcy lawyers shaped, and will they
shape, the bankruptcy laws?
As a general starting point, bankruptcy lawyers have an obvious in-
centive to lobby for rules that encourage the use of bankruptcy, be-
cause more bankruptcy means more work. We might, therefore,
expect to see bankruptcy lawyers push for rules that increase the
number of bankruptcies. Bankruptcy lawyers also may prefer com-
plex rather than simple rules in order to increase their fees in each
given case, although lawyers' interest in complexity is likely to be sub-
ject to an important limitation: lawyers would not want the process to
become so costly that it discourages bankruptcy filings.8 2
In addition to expanding the use of bankruptcy, the bankruptcy bar
also has an incentive to aggressively challenge measures that undercut
their status as the sole source of bankruptcy expertise. That is, bank-
ruptcy lawyers may benefit from restrictions on the supply of bank-
ruptcy expertise, just as they do from any increase in the demand for
bankruptcy.
These are precisely the impulses found at work-often simultane-
ously-if we consider the evolution of American bankruptcy law in
this century. To show this, the analysis that follows focuses first on
bankruptcy personnel, and then on the overall development of bank-
ruptcy law.
80. At least with respect to personal bankruptcy. A number of commentators
have contended that Congress should repeal Chapter 11's corporate reorganization.
See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 1,
101 Yale L.J. 1043 (1992) (proposing reform of corporate bankruptcy law by replacing
court supervised corporate re-organization with a "market-based" solution). Even
here, the arguments have been debated most seriously in academic rather than practi-
cal settings. The recent National Bankruptcy Review Commission almost completely
ignored them.
81. For a similar argument about banks' influence in banking law, see Jonathan R.
Macey. The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 Ohio. St. L.J. 1277, 1288-90
(1989).
82. This observation parallels Michelle White's conclusion that lawyers benefit
most under rules of intermediate complexity, since such rules maximize the likelihood
of litigation. Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers' Benefit from Litiga-
tion, 12 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 381 (1992).
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A. Shaping the Bankruptcy Players: The Case of the
Missing Administrator
If there's a "dog that didn't bark" in American bankruptcy law, it
surely is the absence of a governmental official who acts as bank-
ruptcy administrator. The most telling analogy here is to British bank-
ruptcy law, given that the earliest American bankruptcy law and parts
of subsequent ones were borrowed directly from Great Britain.K In
Great Britain, the bankruptcy administrator (called the Official Re-
ceiver) is a pervasive presence who, among other things, interviews
debtors without counsel present, conducts investigations, and issues
discharge recommendations.8s In American bankruptcy law, no gov-
ernmental officer has remotely comparable powers.'
This isn't for lack of trying. In the 1930s, the Donovan and Thacher
reports, which summarized the findings of an extensive investigation
into bankruptcy practice, strongly recommended the creation of a
bankruptcy administrator based on the British model." In the hear-
ings on legislation derived from the Thacher report recommendations,
small creditors enthusiastically supported this proposal.' Yet bank-
ruptcy lawyers rose as a single voice against the administrator and
managed to derail the proposal. 88
83. See Tabb, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that the 1800 Act paralleled the 1732
English Act).
84. For an excellent discussion of this proposition, see Douglass G. Boshkoff. Lim-
ited, Conditional and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceed-
ings, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69 (1982).
85. Recall from part I that nineteenth century political considerations steered
lawmakers away from reliance on governmental officials in the 1898 Act. The analy-
sis that follows suggests that bankruptcy lawyers have made sure that lawmakers did
not subsequently change their course.
86. See S. Doc. No. 72-65, at 104-07 (1932) (proposing a staff of ten full-time ad-
ministrators under the Attorney General) ("Thacher Report"); Staff of House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 71st Cong., Report on Administration of Bankrupt Estates (Comm.
Print 1931) ("Donovan Report").
87. See, e.g., 1932 Hearings, supra note 69, at 456-61 (statement of Harry N.
Schwartz, Capital Paint & Varnish) (favoring the administrator because small credi-
tors rarely recover anything under the existing bankruptcy laws).
88. The bar's principal arguments were that the administrator would usher in an
unwieldy governmental bureaucracy, and that the approach would drastically alter
thirty years of settled bankruptcy practice. See, e.g., id. at 477 (statement of Jacob M.
Lashly, Bankruptcy Committee of ABA) (advocating maintaining the status quo
rather than adopting a statute to create an administrator). In subsequent years,
lawmakers frequently cited these arguments as the reason the 1932 Bill did not pass.
See H.R. Rep. No. 75-1409, at 1-3 (1937) (statement of Rep. Chandler) (describing the
Chandler Bill).
While the general bankruptcy bar thwarted the movement for a bankruptcy admin-
istrator, the elite corporate reorganization bar did not. As part of the sweeping Chan-
dler Act reforms of 1938, Congress gave the Securities and Exchange Commission a
prominent role in the reorganization of publicly held firms. As it turned out, the
SEC's role proved to be temporary. For an extensive discussion and analysis, see
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy (1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordhain Law Review).
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Forty years later, the next major bankruptcy study, the National
Bankruptcy Commission's report in 1973, once again recommended
that lawmakers cede authority to a bankruptcy administrator in order
to improve bankruptcy administration.8 9 Yet, the bankruptcy bar re-
sponded with vigorous opposition.9" By the time Congress over-
hauled the bankruptcy laws in 1978, the proposed administrator was
long gone.91
Recalling the discussion of bankruptcy lawyers' incentives at the
outset of this part, it is easy to see why bankruptcy lawyers are so
adamantly opposed to an administrator. A British-style administrator
would pose serious threats on each of the issues of particular concern
to bankruptcy lawyers. First, the administrator could chill bankruptcy
filings, since debtors would think twice about filing if they faced rigor-
ous, skeptical scrutiny from a bankruptcy administrator.' Second, to
the extent fact finding is centralized in the administrator, rather than
left to the parties themselves, the administrator would also reduce the
scope of lawyers' involvement in any given case.
The 1978 Code did provide for one new governmental overseer, the
United States Trustee,93 but the U.S. Trustee is best seen as evidence
of the bar's influence over bankruptcy personnel, rather than as a de-
feat. One of the chief criticisms of prior practice was that bankruptcy
judges' conflicting roles-their status as both judge and participant-
created the appearance of a bankruptcy "ring." 94 Like other partici-
pants, bankruptcy lawyers as a group would benefit from reform that
ceded judges' administrative tasks to another official; this would im-
prove bankruptcy's reputation and perhaps its attractiveness.95 But
they would not favor a full-scale bankruptcy administrator.
89. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 93-137, at 129 (1973).
90. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 65, at 83-84 (citing Bankruptcy Act Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1269-70 (1975-76) (statement
of George Ritner, attorney) (complaining that the creation of a bankruptcy adminis-
trator would destroy the consumer bankruptcy bar)).
91. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
92. See, e.g., Boshkoff, supra note 84, at 80-82 (describing the purposes of an initial
examination by the Official Receiver in England).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 586 (1994).
94. A major concern was that judges' participation in the initial creditors' meeting
exposed them to information that might later influence their judicial rulings. George
Triester, a prominent bankruptcy attorney, gives a good, succinct discussion of the
problems in an influential essay he published in 1966. George M. Treister, Bank-
ruptcy Jurisdiction: Is it Too Summary?, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 78, 85-90 (1966) (arguing
for the separation of judges' judicial and administrative functions).
95. This does not mean that all bankruptcy lawyers welcomed the changes. Some
obviously benefitted from the existing framework. For these lawyers, the U.S. Trustee
may have been an interference. The important point is that the U.S. Trustee did not
undermine bankruptcy practice overall.
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The U.S. Trustee fits the bill nicely. 96 Although the U.S. Trustee
now handles the most important administrative tasks, such as oversee-
ing creditors' meetings and appointing trustees, its only additional au-
thority is the right to raise issues neglected by the parties themselves.
Bankruptcy lawyers often complain bitterly about the U.S. Trustee's
activities,97 but the U.S. Trustee has not interfered in any serious way
with the bar's hegemony over the bankruptcy process.
To summarize, we need only glance across the Atlantic to Great
Britain (or north to Canada) to see that a bankruptcy process over-
seen by bankruptcy administrators would look very different than the
American system. The bankruptcy bar has played a decisive role in
steering lawmakers away from such an approach. 9
B. Shaping the Bankruptcy Code
Because bankruptcy lawyers have different kinds of clients, they
will not present a unified front on internal issues such as the scope of
the preference provisions or nuances of the automatic stay.99 They do
have, however, a common interest in the expanded use of bankruptcy.
Perhaps the most straightforward illustration of this is lawyers' enthu-
siasm for two issues addressed by the 1978 Code.
The first is jurisdiction. Prior to the current Bankruptcy Code,
bankruptcy judges' authority was limited to matters that came within
their "summary" jurisdiction. Many issues of real importance did not
fall within their summary jurisdiction, thus diminishing the scope and
effectiveness of the bankruptcy process. 100 Bankruptcy lawyers had
an obvious stake in this, and played a central role in persuading Con-
gress to clarify and greatly expand bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction.,
96. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994) (giving authority to appoint credi-
tors committee in Chapter 11); 28 U.S.C. § 586 (1994) (describing the duties of U.S.
Trustee).
97. For a critical discussion of the U.S. Trustee's office, see Peter C. Alexander, A
Proposal to Abolish the Office of United States Trustee, 30 U. Mich. J.L Reform 1
(1996).
98. Two other efforts by the bankruptcy bar to reinforce bankruptcy lawyers' in-
fluence warrant brief mention. First, the American Bankruptcy Institute has devel-
oped a bankruptcy certification program in recent years, with the obvious goal of
affecting the "supply" of bankruptcy expertise. Second, bankruptcy lawyers have vig-
orously opposed the encroachment of paralegals and other nonexperts on bankruptcy
practice.
99. For example, creditors' lawyers strongly favored the recent amendment of 11
U.S.C. § 550(c), which reversed the effect of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.,
874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989), and which curtailed the trustee's right to avoid pay-
ments made to lenders, whereas debtors' lawyers might have preferred the status quo.
100. See, e.g., Triester, supra note 94, at 79-80 (describing the limits of a bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction over property not controlled by the estate, but arguing that judges'
jurisdiction was much broader than often believed).
101. See, e.g., Frank R. Kennedy, Oral History 38-39 (1989) (discussing "the inordi-
nate amount of time and energy wasted in litigation over the jurisdiction of powers of
the Bankruptcy Court," and his interest "in the project of the National Bankruptcy
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A second concern was to take active steps to improve the reputa-
tion of bankruptcy." 2 Separating the judicial and administrative func-
tions of judges was one major advance; even more revealing were
several adjustments to bankruptcy terminology. Rather than "bank-
rupts," individuals or firms who file for bankruptcy are now called
"debtors," a change designed to help de-stigmatize bankruptcy.
It is easy to see why bankruptcy lawyers pushed for each of these
changes. The issue becomes more subtle if we try to generalize about
other aspects of the bankruptcy process, such as its overall complexity.
The literature on lawyering suggests that there should be a trade-off
between complexity and volume. Lawyers benefit if the background
rules are complex enough to increase litigation, but not too complex,
since excessive complexity tends to discourage litigation. 103
From this perspective, we might expect bankruptcy lawyers to lobby
for relatively complex rules, and they do, but with an important quali-
fication: the trade-off plays out differently for corporate and personal
bankruptcy lawyers. Corporate bankruptcy lawyers have an obvious
interest in complexity. Their strong support for the enactment in 1978
of Chapter 11, the Bankruptcy Code's corporate reorganization chap-
ter, is a good illustration of precisely this.' In place of the much
more rigid (read, "clear") provisions of old Chapter X, which replaced
a debtor's managers with a trustee and prohibited violations of the
absolute priority rule, °5 Chapter 11 substituted a flexible process
whose results are determined by often lengthy negotiations among the
parties themselves.10 6 Bankruptcy lawyers have been a principal ben-
eficiary of the increased length and cost of the bankruptcy process.
Personal bankruptcy practice has developed differently. Perhaps
because many potential debtors have few liquid assets, personal bank-
Conference to achieve an improvement in the jurisdictional provisions of the Bank-
ruptcy Act").
Efforts by the bankruptcy bar to expand bankruptcy jurisdiction go back to the
earliest years of the 1898 Act, and have been a consistent theme throughout the cen-
tury. For an early illustration, see Hearing Before Subcomm. No. 1 of Comm. on the
Judiciary on H.R. 18694, 61st Cong. 31-32 (1910) (statement of Harold Remington,
Esq.) (describing the amendments as giving creditors equivalent rights under federal
bankruptcy law as under state bankruptcy law).
102. See id. at 115 (describing a "deliberate intention" to alter the perception of
bankruptcy as being dominated by a "bankruptcy ring or bankruptcy clique" and to
"bring in a whole new Bar").
103. See White, supra note 82, 383-84.
104. For a discussion of lawyers' support for the flexible approach later enacted as
Chapter 11, see Posner, supra note 65, at 113-14.
105. The absolute priority rule requires that each class of senior creditors must be
paid in full before a lower priority class can receive anything. The absolute priority
rule comes into play in Chapter 11, but only for classes that reject a proposed plan.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994).
106. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 729
(reviewing studies and concluding that Chapter 11 cases take significantly longer than
cases under the prior Bankruptcy Act).
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ruptcy is much more of a volume practice than corporate bank-
ruptcy. 10 7 Personal bankruptcy cases are generally quite short, and
bankruptcy lawyers frequently charge a set fee, rather than billing by
the hour. 08 Because the volume-complexity trade-off is weighted
heavily in favor of volume, personal bankruptcy lawyers are less likely
to lobby for complex provisions. This does not mean that personal
bankruptcy is simple and uniform throughout the country. Because
the Bankruptcy Code incorporates state law on crucial issues such as
exemptions, and because of differing local practices, consumer bank-
ruptcy varies substantially among districts.10 9 But within any given
district, clear patterns tend to emerge 10 and, most importantly, cases
are processed quickly."1
To the extent bankruptcy lawyers influence legislative develop-
ments, then, the Bankruptcy Code should develop in ways that in-
crease the attractiveness of bankruptcy. Corporate bankruptcy
lawyers also benefit if the bankruptcy process is complex, whereas
personal bankruptcy lawyers will prefer rules that are clear enough to
maximize volume.
Just as it explains the relentless expansion of bankruptcy law over
the last several decades, bankruptcy lawyers' influence also helps to
make sense of a puzzle numerous observers have noticed in the rela-
107. The administrative feature that most obviously contributes to the speed of
consumer cases is the absence of a creditor vote even in Chapter 13, the chapter that
provides for vage-earner plans. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994) (requiring only judicial
approval). This feature dates back to the 1898 Act, which eliminated creditor ap-
proval. See, &g., H.R. Rep. No. 54-1228, at 2-3, 15 (1896) (describing this as a change
from the 1867 Act).
108. In her fascinating study comparing the consumer bankruptcy bars in four Ohio
and Texas districts, Jean Braucher discusses the standard fee arrangements in each
district. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy." One Code, Many Cul-
tures, 67 Am. Bankr. L. 501,546-47 (1993). The fee structures elsewhere are compa-
rable, though the fees themselves vary from district to district, as they do among the
districts Braucher studied.
109. State regulation of exemptions is an illustration of an issue that cannot be
attributed to bankruptcy lawyers. Rather than bankruptcy lawyers, federalism ex-
plains this longstanding concession to state lawmaking, as discussed in part I. But, as
noted below, local variation of this sort may benefit at least some bankruptcy lawyers.
In the report it recently forwarded to Congress, the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission focused heavily on the variability among districts, and several of its pro-
posals (such as a proposal to establish federal parameters for exemptions) seek to
introduce greater uniformity.
110. A good illustration of this is the requirement in Chapter 13 that debtors con-
tribute all of their disposable income to their wage-earner plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) (1994). Although the "disposable income" requirement is extraordinarily
vague, local practice tends to clarify it a great deal-usually by establishing rough
parameters as to what percentage of creditors' claims a plan must, as a minimum,
propose to pay. See, eg., Braucher, supra note 108, at 532 (describing minimum pay-
ment percentages in each of four districts).
111. Notice that the combination of local variation and generally brief cases may
benefit local consumer bankruptcy lawyers, since it enhances the importance of local
expertise without making bankruptcy so costly as to discourage bankruptcy filings.
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tionship between bankruptcy and the state law (most prominently, the
regulation of secured transactions in Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code) governing debtor-creditor law. Unlike Article 9, which
is largely a secured lender statute, most commentators view bank-
ruptcy as having a pro-debtor bias.1 12 Although several commentators
have speculated that this bias reflects successful lobbying of debtors
and unsecured creditors, 13 we have seen that neither of these groups
have contributed to the pro-debtor bias-nor do they have strong in-
centives to do so in the future.1 4 The obvious explanation for bank-
ruptcy's pro-debtor bias is the bankruptcy bar. However much
creditors' and debtors' lawyers may reflect their clients' perspectives
on internal bankruptcy issues, both have an enormous stake in in-
creasing the overall use of bankruptcy. It is this common interest in
expansive bankruptcy laws that has made all the difference.
C. The Limits of Lawyer Hegemony
The analysis thus far has ignored other interests in order to empha-
size bankruptcy lawyers' influence on the legislative process. This
oversimplifies things, of course. A variety of groups, from creditors
and debtors to interest groups with narrower interests, and even
lawmakers interested in patronage opportunities, leave their mark on
bankruptcy. Even so, what we see if we relax the assumption of law-
yer hegemony is that lawyers-or, at the least, their interests, 15 -
often seem to shape the victories of other constituencies.
Secured lender successes provide a convenient illustration of how
interest group influence is often channeled in a lawyer-friendly direc-
tion. In recent years, real estate lenders have lobbied hard (and for
good reason) for restrictions on debtors' ability to file for Chapter 11
in single asset real estate cases. 1 6 In 1994, the real estate lobby won
an important victory, persuading Congress to adjust bankruptcy's au-
tomatic stay provision. Courts now must lift the stay, and let real es-
112. See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1783, 1849 n.215
(1994).
113. See id.; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on
Scott, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1853, 1874 (1994) ("Debtors... and unsecured creditors typically
are considered to be the winners in bankruptcy rulemaking.").
114. See supra notes 58-72 and accompanying text.
115. This is an important caveat. Simply because an amendment seems to benefit
lawyers does not mean that lobbying by lawyers secured it. But in some places the
cause-and-effect relationship is clear (as in the defeat of proposals for an administra-
tor) and in many other contexts it seems likely.
116. Real estate lenders' concerns are justified because most single asset real estate
cases involve two-party disputes between the lender and the debtor, and do not really
belong in bankruptcy. The principal effect of bankruptcy is to delay foreclosure. See,
e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 194-95 (1986) (sug-
gesting that filing bankruptcy is inappropriate when used simply to delay foreclosure).
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tate lenders foreclose, unless the debtor within ninety days either
proposes a reorganization plan or starts making interest payments."1 7
The benefits to lawyers of this solution are obvious. Rather than
excluding single asset real estate cases from bankruptcy, the new pro-
vision assures that real estate debtors will continue to file for bank-
ruptcy; and through the simple expedient of proposing a
reorganization plan, the debtor can remain in bankruptcy. The provi-
sion is something of a compromise, and fits the pattern nearly all
Bankruptcy Code compromises take: an amendment ensuring that fu-
ture cases continue to make their way into bankruptcy.
Equally revealing are the frequent amendments to § 365 of the
Code, which authorizes a debtor to assume or reject executory con-
tracts. 1 8 The most sensible approach to executory contracts would be
to limit a debtor's right to assume or to reject based on the parties'
respective enticements outside of bankruptcy. If nonbankruptcy law
gives a nondebtor the right to insist on specific performance, the
debtor should not be permitted to reject a contract and relegate the
nondebtor to an unsecured damages claim.119 On several occasions in
recent years, Congress has amended § 365 to correct flagrant devia-
tions from this principle.1 2 1 Yet lawmakers continue to make case-by-
case exceptions, rather than simply revising the section as a whole to
incorporate nonbankruptcy law. Obvious beneficiaries of this ap-
proach are bankruptcy lawyers, since more pervasive reform could di-
minish many debtors' ability to reorganize.'12
The most recent literature addressing interest group influence on
rulemaking suggests that lawmakers will adopt clear rules if one group
dominates, and murkier rules when there are competing interest
groups.12 2 As the illustrations above suggest, the Bankruptcy Code
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3) (1994).
118. See id. § 365.
119. This perspective is defended at length in Michael T. Andrew, Erecutory Con-
tracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection", 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1988).
120. The most prominent illustration is § 365(n), which was designed to overturn
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Ridmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir.
1985). See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (giving licensees the authority to prevent a debtor from
rejecting the licensee's rights under a licensing agreement); see also id. § 365(h) (stat-
ing that a lessee of real estate may retain rights under a lease even if the debtor-lessor
rejects).
121. Other beneficiaries may be lawmakers themselves, since continual tinkering
with the bankruptcy laws may enable them to maximize interest group support. Cf
Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreas-
ing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 913, 934-45 (1987) (focusing on legisla-
tors' benefits from amendments to the Internal Revenue Code). Similarly. the
interest groups that secure these protections sometimes have little interest or stake in
bankruptcy reform other than the narrow concern at issue. For a complaint along
these lines, see Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 Harv. J. on Legis.
1, 43-44 (1985).
122. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legis-
latures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595, 651 (1995). Schwartz and Scott explicitly limit their
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loosely confirms this prediction, though with an important caveat:
clear rules often take the form of a limited carve-out, and the Code's
clear and murky rules both tend to bear the fingerprints of the bank-
ruptcy bar.
D. Do Bankruptcy Lawyers Promote Efficiency?
To say that bankruptcy lawyers have influenced the shape of bank-
ruptcy does not necessarily mean that they have prodded it in an inef-
ficient direction. Elsewhere in commercial law, commentators have
argued that a dominant interest group actually has an incentive to
take its customers' desires into account. Just as a monopolistic manu-
facturer does best if it offers efficient rather than inadequate warranty
coverage and uses its market power solely to charge a higher price, 23
secured lenders such as banks arguably have an incentive to seek effi-
cient commercial law if they have influence in the legislative con-
text."2 4 If bankruptcy lawyers are like the manufacturer or banks,
they may actually push bankruptcy law in an efficient direction; if not,
their influence is more cause for concern.
Unfortunately, bankruptcy lawyers do not have the same incentives
for efficiency. One reason for this is that a monopolist has less benign
incentives if the rule in question raises the cost of alternative prod-
ucts. 125 Many of the rules that bankruptcy lawyers support have pre-
cisely this effect. Probably the best example is the long-established
rule that debtors cannot waive their right to file for bankruptcy,12 6
which dramatically raises the cost of pursuing nonbankruptcy alterna-
tives for dealing with financial distress. The recent proposal to se-
verely restrict pre-petition waivers of the automatic stay is the latest
variation on this theme.12 7 Just as bankruptcy lawyers' historical op-
analysis to private legislatures, and their model makes assumptions that do not fully
hold with Congressional decision-making, but interest group activity is likely to be
similar in many respects in the two contexts. See id.
123. See George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale
L.J. 1297, 1321 n.115 (1981) (citing Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its
Regulation, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 548, 548-85 (1969)).
124. See George G. Triantis, Private Law-Making and the Uniform Commercial
Code, in New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 117,119-21 (Peter New-
man ed., 1998).
125. See id. at 119 (citing Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompe-
titive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 Yale L.J. 209
(1986)).
126. See, e.g., Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that "an
advance agreement to waive the benefits of the Act would be void"); In re Peli, 31
B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Agreements waiving the right to file a peti-
tion in bankruptcy violate public policy and will not be given effect." (citations
omitted)).
127. See National Bankr. Rev. Comm'n, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years
§ 2.4.5 (1997). A blanket prohibition of stay waivers is quite clearly inefficient, and
will draw opposition from asset-based lenders who bear the cost of the pointless bank-
ruptcies that often result. The analysis of this part suggests either that Congress will
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position to a bankruptcy administrator can be seen as an effort to pre-
serve their authority inside bankruptcy, their opposition to stay
waivers helps to thwart the development of alternative responses to
financial distress.
Second, an entity that has market power will charge an excessive
price,a and the provisions lawyers support often have as much to do
with the price as with the quality of the bankruptcy "product." To
choose the most obvious example, the liberalization of attorneys' fees
in the 1978 Code 29 increased not only the quality, but also the price
of the bankruptcy process. 130
Just as we cannot assume that bankruptcy lawyers will push bank-
ruptcy law in an efficient direction, it also is important not to overstate
their bias toward inefficiency. The bankruptcy bar itself is relatively
competitive and, as we have seen, other interest groups make them-
selves heard in various ways. Consistent with this, it is important to
note that some bankruptcy changes (such as expanding the jurisdic-
tion of bankruptcy courts) can be defended on normative grounds.
With these caveats in mind, we can summarize as follows: bankruptcy
lawyers exert significant influence over the shape of the bankruptcy
process, and they have a strong incentive to maximize the use of bank-
ruptcy. This means more rather than less bankruptcy and, particularly
for corporate bankruptcy, a more complex process than might other-
wise be the case.
CONCLUSION
The United States is notoriously litigation-oriented as compared to
otherwise similar nations. The United States has more lawyers than
anywhere else, and Americans habitually turn to the legal system to
address issues that other countries deal with in other ways. The
United States bankruptcy system is, in many respects, a perfect reflec-
tion of this. Bankruptcy functions much like the more elaborate social
insurance frameworks in place in Europe and elsewhere, and bank-
ruptcy lawyers are the engine that makes bankruptcy laws go.'
fail to act on this issue (given the competing positions of lenders and lawyers), or will
adopt a compromise position upholding some waivers but only after a discretionary
ruling by the bankruptcy court.
128. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 123, at 1321 (discussing the exploitation theory).
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (1994) (authorizing the employment of professionals
"on any reasonable terms and conditions").
130. More subtly, quality and price are similarly intertwined in the debtor's exclu-
sive right to propose a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (stating that the
debtor-in-possession has the exclusive right to propose a plan for 120 days, and the
court can extend this period). Whatever its benefits, exclusivity clearly increases the
duration of bankruptcy, and thus increases legal fees.
131. For an analysis of the relationship between bankruptcy and social welfare laws
in the United States, see Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense
of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usur, Laws, and Related Limitations on the Free-
dona to Contract, 24 J. Legal Stud. 283, 307-08 (1995).
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This much is common coinage. What is not so obvious is why the
United States has such a lawyer-intensive bankruptcy system. This
Article has suggested an answer to that question. What we have seen
is that the 1898 Bankruptcy Act created the need for many more
bankruptcy lawyers than previously had existed. Once the 1898 Act
called the bankruptcy bar into being, the bar responded both by assur-
ing the permanence of the Act, and by beginning to reshape American
bankruptcy law in its own image. We see this most dramatically in
bankruptcy lawyers' repeated success in stymieing proposals to create
a bankruptcy administrator, and in the continual expansion of the
scope of bankruptcy law.
Bankruptcy lawyers are only one of many groups that have a large
stake in the contours of bankruptcy law. But no other group has had
nearly so far-reaching an influence as bankruptcy lawyers, and there is
little reason to expect this to change anytime soon.
